THE CHAPLAIN AND AREA COVERAGE IN ROCAD

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A MONOGRAPH

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INTRODUCTION:

1. Recent reorganization of Armored Division makes this study necessary.
2. Introduction of atomics to battle field has increased dispersion between units and within units.
3. Problem presents itself for the first time. There is no literature as such.

OBJECTIVE: TO INVESTIGATE

1. Whether presently assigned Chaplains can give proper area coverage; or
2. Whether consideration should be given to a reassignment of Chaplains to provide a more adequate distribution for area coverage and to increase flexibility.

BODY

1. Present complement of Chaplains.
   a. How distributed and assigned.
   b. Is this arrangement adequate.
   c. Does it lack necessary coverage denominationally.
2. Means to insure wider coverage.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Need for additional Chaplains
   a. In particular-need for Jewish coverage.
2. Rearrangement of assignment of Chaplains and return to previous combat command assignment.
3. Pool of Chaplains under Division control assigning teams as need arises.

4. Division Chaplain to be a part of Main C.P. to facilitate better use of Chaplains.

5. Chaplain assigned armored personnel carrier as office, protection, to travel freely, and to be with front line troops.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. AR describing the meaning, nature and application of area coverage by the Chaplain.

2. Policy in SOP on the use of the Chaplain in area coverage.
   a. Succession if there are Chaplain casualties.
   b. All Commanders to be briefed concerning meaning of area coverage.
   c. System of assignment.

3. The team idea may remove from the armored division for a period of time Chaplains who would normally assist in area coverage. This makes the demand for area coverage even more vital and realistic.

4. If no changes are made, the Division Chaplain must be dedicated and carefully selected.

THE CHAPLAIN AND AREA COVERAGE IN ROCAD

The recent reorganization of the Armored Division makes this study necessary. The introduction of atomics to the battlefield has increased dispersion between units and within units. This problem presents itself for the first time. There is no literature concerning it as such. This monograph is not the answer to all problems, but may serve to indicate some of the problems which exist now, and may be used as the beginning of necessary study in this field. The objective of this Monograph is to investigate whether Chaplains as presently assigned can give proper area coverage and, if not, whether consideration should be given to a reassignment of Chaplains to provide a more adequate distribution for area coverage and to increase flexibility.

A guide would be of value not only for the successful accomplishment of the Chaplain's mission, but also for the complete employment of Chaplains in tactical operations. The envisioned area of coverage might be from seven to nine miles wide and about twenty five thousand yards, or about fifteen miles in depth. The question is, can eighteen Chaplains do it? Or better, can twelve Protestant Chaplains and six Catholic Chaplains give proper denominational coverage to 14,617 souls organic to the Armored Division with many additional small units assigned for an operation?

At present the breakdown and distribution of Chaplains is as follows: Three Chaplains at Division Headquarters, one per each Armored infantry battalion, one per each tank battalion, two at Division Trains, one with the Engineer battalion, and four with Division Artillery. A question immediately presents itself concerning the Catholic Chaplains. Where will they be assigned? Experience factors indicate that one should be assigned to Division Headquarters, and one with Division Artillery. The other four perhaps would be assigned to each of the four infantry battalions. The twelve Protestant Chaplains would fill the remaining slots of the units as mentioned above. It should be noticed that there is no Catholic Chaplain at Division Trains.

On paper the distribution appears to give adequate coverage, but in fact it does not. This becomes clearer when we realize that mobility or the scattering of troops is of essence to armor. The Armored division is capable of covering extensive fronts and deep zones of action. Among its missions are offensive operations designed to achieve deep penetration and pursuit of enemy forces. It gains its objectives through its ability to move. It moves from dispersed unit assembly areas. Being indoctrinated with a "mobility of mind" it makes it difficult for anyone to catch or to find individual units even though tank communications are the best. Combat units as well as service support elements are vehicle-mounted giving great cross-country mobility and flexibility which is always

exploited. Add to this the concept that atomic warfare conditions will be the normal battlefield environment for armored division operations. There need be no concern with coverage in training. Somehow no matter what the shortages or circumstances in the training situation, the zeal of assigned Chaplains gets them around to give necessary ministrations. In spite of handicaps, difficulties and obstacles, the troops there get some coverage.

The first serious inadequacy to be noticed about the new arrangement is the assigning of the Division Chaplain. He is placed in the Division Headquarters Rear echelon. His place, however, is with the Division Main Command Post to facilitate his supervision of area coverage. The Command Post is the nerve center of the operations and communications of the Armored Division. The manner in which it functions determines to a major degree the effectiveness of the command and control which the division commander is able to exercise. The Chaplain, as a special staff officer, should be close to Headquarters where his advice can be used and he is available for consultation by other members of the operating staff.

Instead of three Chaplains in the rear and, assuming that Division Headquarters would have two Protestant Chaplains and one Catholic Chaplain, one of the Protestant Chaplains could be assigned to the Rear echelon with the remaining two at Division Main. It is expected that the two busiest Chaplains in the entire Division will be the Division and the Assistant

Division Chaplain. This is as it should be. Why not utilize them more effectively by assigning them to the Division Main C.P.

Four Chaplains to cover Division Artillery troops seem to be enough in spite of the great dispersion. It might be noted that the usual arrangement of three Protestant Chaplains and one Catholic Chaplain, might leave quite a task for the Catholic Chaplain. Armored Artillery will have three Armored 105-mm howitzer battalions and an armored general support (composite) battalion.

Coverage by the Engineer Battalion Chaplain of this unit is not difficult. When working as a unit and when supporting other operations they will be covered by the Chaplain of the supported unit. If they operate in support of a task force or command, he will be available to lend assistance to the other units in the Division combat zone.

Division Trains has two assigned Chaplains. The Armored Medical Battalion is normally located here. Casualties will be evacuated to and from the Medical Battalion. It may include four clearing stations for receipt, sorting and temporary medical care of patients, evacuating casualties from battalion aid stations and providing ambulance support to units of the Division. It is important for Chaplains to keep this in mind when planning. In offensive operations, the Division clearing stations are normally established along the axis of advance of each committed combat

command. The principal support is to be rendered by the field army in the area of medical services and the field hospital and evacuation hospital will be employed. This, of course, means that the Chaplains attached to these medical centers will render necessary services once the patient has reached these facilities.

In a retrograde movement the coordination expediting medical evacuation normally makes use of helicopter ambulance units provided by army. When such units are not available, or cannot provide the support required, aircraft from the aviation company may be employed. Air evacuation directly from the battalion aid station is used to the maximum for the evacuation of such casualties. With this in mind the Assistant Division Chaplain should maintain close liaison with hospitals supporting the Division. During those periods where there is a lull in action in the Division Zone or when the Division has been withdrawn for reorganization, or retraining, Chaplains should attempt to visit their wounded.

Practically speaking the problem of area coverage narrows itself, outside of emergencies as a result of atomic strikes on our troops, to coverage during offensive operations, where the greatest problems exist. The SOP must spell out clearly the duties of all Chaplains. At present there seems to be no rule or set policy except as established at local level. Let us assume, for sake of discussion, that the Catholic Chaplains would be assigned to the Armored Infantry Battalions, while the Protestant Chaplains would go to Tank Battalions.

In all this there is no provision made for coverage of Jewish personnel. There are but a few Jewish Chaplains in the Army, and those few must be assigned at those headquarters where they can provide for the needs of the greatest number of Jewish personnel. Still this is a practical situation and it would appear that Jewish men have little or no coverage. It might be asked what can one Jewish Chaplain do among troops so dispersed. The question is beside the point. These men are entitled to religious coverage. Emphasis, however, on the need for Jewish coverage is misplaced. The very small percentage of Jewish personnel in an Armored Division, approximately 420, hardly justified one Chaplain. It is recommended, therefore,that each Division has assigned to the Division Chaplain's Office, one good assistant, male, Jewish, to handle Jewish coverage and problems involving Jewish personnel.

The salient armored characteristic of crushing shock action, resulting also from the combination of mobility and maneuverability, is brought to its highest state of effectiveness by the habitual employment of the combat command task force concept of organization and operation within the division. How are we best to utilize our Chaplains with the plan of making each of the three combat command Headquarters the nucleus around which the major task groupings are organized? Each combat command is to be formed on a task force basis to include armored infantry, tanks, engineers, artillery and other support as required by the mission. Furthermore, within each combat command, the task force concept is further employed by the formation of

battalion task forces through the cross attachment of tank and armored infantry companies, between attached battalions or the utilization of pure tank and armored infantry battalions.

Whether the operation is offensive, defensive, retrograde or a special offensive, it will be difficult to give coverage. When the combat command task force includes both tank battalions and armored infantry battalions, there will be denominational coverage, though the troops will be widely dispersed. If the task force, however, is limited to a Battalion, religious coverage will be limited to one battalion Chaplain, either Protestant or Catholic. If the Armored Infantry Battalion attacks without the Armored Tank Battalion there is no Protestant coverage. If the tank Battalions only attack there is no Catholic coverage. If the initial attack is in column on a narrow front with considerable depth, two chaplains are not enough to be close to the men. This formation presents a profitable atomic target to the enemy. What if the Chaplain is away from his troops? Still this would be less difficult to cover than two or three combat commands abreast.

Organic to the Armored Division are four Armored Tank Battalions and four Armored Infantry battalions. With (P) for Protestant,and (C) for Catholic, for the purpose of illustration, suppose the Chaplains are assigned as follows: 1st MTB 66th Armor (C), 1st MTB 67th Armor (P), 1st MTB 68th Armor (P), 1st MTB 69th Armor (C), 112th Armored Infantry Battalion (C), 113th Armored Infantry Battalion (P), 114th Armored Infantry Battalion (P), and 115th Armored Infantry

Battalion (C). Suppose also that the G-3 organizes CCA with the 66th Tank, 69th Tank, and the 112th Infantry. In these battalions there are Catholic Chaplains only, and there would be no Protestant coverage. Or suppose CCB is organized with the 67th Tank, 113th Infantry, and the 114th Infantry with the attachments and support. There would be only Protestant coverage and no Catholic coverage. Here again is a good reason why the Division Chaplain should be at Division Main C.P. He must be in on all planning of operations involving units of the Division. If, perchance, no change is made as is recommended in this monograph, and the TOE calling for Chaplains to be assigned to battalions remains, at least an attempt could be made at the last minute to make the proper distribution to assure coverage. This while unsatisfactory is a step in the right direction. How often in a combat or emergency situation can such a change be made? On short notice coverage of distance and the coordination of the link up and exchange may be even more difficult if not impossible to accomplish within the desired time.

Now we might ask here, how many unit Commanders would permit this? One method of seeing that this plan is effected is to spell it out clearly in the Division SOP. It is sure trouble unless forestalled. It is the experience of some Chaplains that, the idea of area coverage, even with the

SOP and the necessary briefing beforehand of the interested Commander, is not accepted. This even in a day of shortage of Chaplains when area coverage is understood as the only means of complete coverage. Will there ever be a day when all units will have a Chaplain assigned? Hardly, and area coverage is here to stay. A unit feels that it owns its' Chaplain and can claim more of his time than he in conscience can give. If he does not give the time he is in trouble. It is possible in an isolated case that he will be dealt with by a poor efficiency report, which will bring down his OEI, his chances for promotion will be hurt and his career will suffer. There is a tendency to neglect other battalions. On the other hand, other battalions tend to consider a Chaplain not assigned to their unit, an outsider, especially on administrative problems. In a sense, if we look at the other side, it is unfair to the battalion to have a Chaplain working elsewhere or on area coverage, for he cannot be a true battalion Chaplain. Furthermore communications in the field are more limited, since the Chaplain must try to contact other units through his own communication center where direct communication with other units for which the Chaplain is responsible is not always possible. The only real advantage to the Battalion Chaplain set up is that it does give the Chaplain a sense of belonging which he would not get otherwise.

Even in the non-atomic concept the problem of distance in a tank division is great. With the threat of atomic warfare of course, it becomes more serious. Assembly areas will never be in close proximity to friendly front lines and armored units must be prepared to launch their attack from widely-dispersed assembly areas to reduce the vulnerability of the Division to enemy atomic attack. The distance from the rear assembly area to the attack will be as much as from twenty to fifty miles. One problem about which we need not worry is the needless bunching of Chaplains. We will be at the other extreme and, if anything, will be thinly spread.

There is even greater dispersion in a defensive operation, whether it is mobile or a position defense, because greater depth is essential to prevent enemy exploitation of a penetration by troops or atomic weapons. Situations too will exist when the area being defended is of such width that initial organization in greater depth is not possible. For instance, the Armored Division acting as a covering force, would be operating fifteen to twenty miles in front of COPL and thinly spread over a distance of fifty to seventy five miles wide.

Another coverage problem for the Chaplain is the retrograde operation in the withdrawal from action, delaying action and retirement. No matter how well-planned the withdrawal, or how orderly the movement to the rear disengaging

from the enemy, dispersal continues. These are problems which must be solved in proper area coverage. Once again because it is possible that our troops may be in defensive or retrograde operations the Division Chaplain must be at Division Main C.P. to keep in touch with changing conditions. This is repeated in spite of the terse statement made previously.

The present assignment of Chaplains is inadequate. Some of the situations in which it does not work have been outlined above. One of the important units without coverage is the Armored Cavalry Squadron which performs reconnaissance and provides security over extended frontages, operates as a task force along or with replacements, executes combat missions as an economy of force unit, but does all this without a Chaplain. In the defensive, the Armored Cavalry squadron is particularly on the move, roving around alertly against airborne drops, air landings or atom attacks in the rear, as well as giving protection against infiltration by guerrillas, refugees or civilian interference. What coverage can the men expect during these periods? Certainly there should be opportunity to fall back on a Chaplain out of the pool, as the need arises.

Obviously there is a need for additional Chaplains. Eighteen Chaplains no matter how strong, dedicated and zealous, are physically unable to extend themselves that much. Let us first say, by way of repetition that the present ROCAD TOE for

Chaplains as far as area coverage is concerned does not meet the need. There are two solutions. The first is to return to the original Combat Command assignment of Chaplains. This would mean that instead of eight Chaplains assigned to the Armored Infantry and the Tank Battalions, there would be nine with three to each Combat Command. This recommendation is made in spite of the feeling that there has been discussion in the past concerning the Combat Command versus the Battalion assignment idea. Obviously the result of previous discussions and recommendations by other Armored Chaplains is the preferred Battalion idea. This monograph disagrees and maintains that coverage is better in the Combat Command principle because of the idea of the pool there. It would avoid any difficulties with commanders who feel that their Chaplain must remain with the unit giving nothing for the area. Individual Chaplains too at times are prone to stay with their own units.

Another way of coverage is to place Chaplains in a pool in the Support or Trains Battalion, Division Artillery excepted, under Division control. From the pool, Chaplains would be farmed out to division units in accordance with the need. The pool could take care of any situation no matter how quickly it might arise. There would be no problem in quick adjustment. One Chaplain would be designated as the coordinator and Senior Chaplain in Paragraph 4 of the Operation Order, and Chaplains would be listed by denomination. He would draw his Chaplains and they would move out. This system, however, suffers when

the units are in dispersal. The Division Chaplain, acting for the Commander, with the Division SOP as a guide would recommend the assignment to G-1/AG. The SOP would have to include mention of assignments prior to combat, and an organized approach to the question of equipment. Possibly the Chaplains would lose much of their value if they are in a different unit every few weeks or even months, if that should happen, but the emphasis here is on area coverage. The job has to be done and that is why all Chaplains would have to develop a loyalty to the Division rather than become attached to a unit.

Each Chaplain would have, as part of the team, his enlisted assistant. A quarter ton truck with trailer would be assigned to each Chaplain. Occasionally individual Chaplains complain that they have a difficult time getting an assistant and/or transportation. It is the Division Chaplain's responsibility to coordinate this properly. The nature of the Chaplains work is of such kind that he virtually cannot function without an assistant and transportation. If the idea of a pool of Chaplains at Division becomes a reality, the assistants must be assigned to a similar pool. Not only do we insist on no interference with the basic need of assistant and transportation, we go one step further with the picture as it has been presented. The responsibilities of the Chaplain are so important that each Chaplain would have more flexibility and he would be more capable of performing his mission if he had assigned to him an armored personnel carrier. This would not only provide protection but

also enable him to travel freely among the Armored Division in performing his duties. Furthermore, once the attack comes, all thin-skinned vehicles, such as jeeps, will be relegated to the rear. Without a personnel carrier he may find himself back at Trains instead of with his troops, or completely at the mercy of someone else for his transportation needs.

Throughout this monograph we have referred to an SOP. The real answer is in an AR to outline the meaning, nature and application of Chaplain area coverage. In view of the fact that we are without regulations for the present it is recommended that every Armored Division have an SOP concerning Chaplains to include the following: 1. Policy concerning succession if the Division Chaplain becomes a casualty. The Senior Chaplain in line would be the replacement and higher headquarters in Chaplain channels would have to be alerted as soon as practicable even before a requisition is made officially; 2. No matter what the assignment of Chaplains whether, it is to Battalion, Combat Command or Teams, all Commanders of units authorized a Chaplain, are to be briefed on the meaning and application of area coverage. Each should be willing and ready to give up his Chaplain if a greater need for such arises; 3. A system of assignment of Chaplains to give the maximum coverage denominationally.

The team idea may remove from the Armored Division for a period of time Chaplains who would normally assist in area coverage. This makes the demand for area coverage even

more vital and realistic. Nor can the Chaplain forget that he has a serious obligation to keep himself in tip top physical condition all the time. He should take training where possible. If he cannot take care of himself, he will not be able to minister to the troops to give them the benefit of his spiritual and mental qualifications, so needed.

At the same time, to be realistic and to face facts it is foreseeable that no action will be taken for some time to make changes such as recommended in this paper. This being so, there is nothing to do except to operate within the assignment and framework as already set up. Chaplains more than even before, in the spirit of charity will have to work as a team for mutual survival and cooperate with and relieve one another whenever possible in all fields save those of conscience and what is of a strictly denominational basis. All Chaplains can bring comfort, reassurance and self control to their men. They can instill resolution and composure and an incorruptible faith as an antidote to panic and as a spur to courage and patience. The most serious responsibility will rest upon the shoulders of the Division Chaplain. His is a responsibility never as serious. The threat of Atomic warfare calls for a dedicated Chaplain, a man of God who will be vitally concerned with the spiritual welfare, morale and religious needs of the whole Command. Having succeeded in establishing the proper rapport with the Division Commander, and tactfully able to establish clearly the necessity of area coverage in the SOP, the saving factor

will be only in the shifting about of the Chaplain as the emergency need arises.

The author of CONARC training Text 17-100-2 THE ARMORED DIVISION, March 1957, must be unaware of the role of the Chaplain. It is hoped that the remarks in this monograph may serve at least as a guide to plan for area coverage of the personnel of an Armored Division.

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